The Epistemology of Geometry

Pt. II Philosophy of Physics Lecture 4, 6 February 2015, Adam Caulton (aepw2@cam.ac.uk)

1 Euclidean geometry

1. Any two points determine a unique finite straight line (the points are its endpoints).
2. Any finite straight line may be extended to a unique straight line.
3. Any point and a distance (radius) determines a unique circle.
4. All right angles are equal to one another.
5. (The parallel postulate:) If a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles.

1-4 are known as absolute geometry. Euclid himself may have seen 5 as qualitatively different, since he proved his first 28 propositions without it. An alternative to the parallel postulate (logically equivalent, under the assumption of absolute geometry) is Playfair’s axiom:

5’. Any straight line and any point not on that line determine a unique straight line parallel to the first.

2 Non-Euclidean geometries

Bolyai and Lobachevski independently discovered non-Euclidean geometries in 1823. (In fact they had been discovered before by Gauss, but he did not publish.) These geometries are obtained by denying the fifth postulate. Specifically, we may either: (i) deny that parallels exist; or (ii) deny that they are unique. Possibility (i) leads to elliptical (a.k.a. Riemann) geometry; possibility (ii) leads to hyperbolic (a.k.a. Bolyaian or Lobachevskian) geometry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geometry</th>
<th>Curvature</th>
<th># of parallels</th>
<th>Sum of triangle’s angles</th>
<th>Circum./diam.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elliptical</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&gt; 180°</td>
<td>&lt; π</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euclidean</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>180°</td>
<td>π</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbolic</td>
<td>negative</td>
<td>∞</td>
<td>&lt; 180°</td>
<td>&gt; π</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table adapted from Carnap (1966, 133).)

Non-Euclidean geometries were proved to be consistent by providing a model of them in Euclidean space. For example in two dimensions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘plane’:</th>
<th>Elliptical</th>
<th>Euclidean</th>
<th>Hyperbolic 1</th>
<th>Hyperbolic 2</th>
<th>Hyperbolic 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘point’:</td>
<td>antipodal pair</td>
<td>plane</td>
<td>point in disc</td>
<td>point in disc</td>
<td>point in half-plane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘line’:</td>
<td>great circle</td>
<td>straight line</td>
<td>chord</td>
<td>perp arc</td>
<td>semi-circle on edge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(and there are higher-dimensional analogues...)

1
According to Kant, the postulates of Euclidean geometry are synthetic \textit{a priori} judgements, delivered to us by our pure intuition of space. (Compare with arithmetic: delivered to us by our pure intuition of time.)

Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding allows for two notions of necessity, captured by \textit{a priori} and analytic, respectively. Therefore it is doubtful that Kant would have been concerned with the fact that non-Euclidean geometries are logically consistent—the question is whether they are intuitable. On this point Frege was on Kant’s side:

Empirical propositions hold good of what is physically or psychologically actual, the truths of geometry govern all that is spatially intuitable, whether actual or product of our fancy. The wildest visions of delirium, the boldest inventions of legend and poetry, where animals speak and stars stand still, where men are turned to stone and trees turn into men, where the drowning haul themselves up out of swamps by their own topknots – all these remain, so long as they remain intuitable, still subject to the axioms of geometry. Conceptual thought alone can after a fashion shake off this yoke, when it assumes, say, a space of four dimensions or positive curvature. To study such conceptions is not useless by any means; but it is to leave the ground of intuition entirely behind. . . . For purposes of conceptual thought we can always assume the contrary of some one or other of the geometrical axioms, without involving ourselves in any self-contradictions. . . . The fact that this is possible shows that the axioms of geometry are independent of one another and of the primitive laws of logic, and consequently are synthetic. Can the same be said of the fundamental propositions of the science of number? Here, we have only to try denying any one of them, and complete confusion ensues. Even to think at all seems no longer possible. (\textit{The Foundations of Arithmetic}, pp. 20-21.)

Indeed: the interpretations above seek to establish the consistency of non-Euclidean geometries \textit{on the basis of the truth of Euclidean geometry!}

The more pressing questions for Kant are (cf. Coffa (1991, 45)):

1. \textit{How} does pure intuition support the necessity of Euclidean geometry?

2. \textit{Why} must a geometric argument be guided by pure intuition?

4 Helmholtz and Einstein: geometrical empiricism

Helmholtz made trouble for Kant along the lines of the first question by arguing that \textit{we can intuitively represent non-Euclidean space to ourselves.} (For discussion of the second question, see Carnap (1966, Ch. 17.).) Helmholtz wished to establish that geometry is empirical (i.e. synthetic \textit{a posteriori}); a view that was later supported by Einstein (1921).

By the much misused expression ‘to represent’ or ‘to be able to think of how something happens’, I understand that one could depict the series of sense-impressions one would have if such a thing happened in a particular case, I do not see how one could understand anything else by it without abandoning the whole sense of the
expression. (‘On the Origin and Significance of the Axioms of Geometry’ [1870], in Helmholtz (1921).)

- The mirrorball universe: how reliable are our intuitions about the geometry of space?
- The auxiliary sphere (the 3-dimensional analogue to Hyperbolic 1): judgements of congruence as governed by habit rather than pure intuition.
- Parallel rail tracks (Reichenbach’s example).
- The germ of conventionalism: to test geometrical axioms empirically, we must first know which objects are rigid, which surfaces flat and which edges straight, but “we only decide whether a body is rigid, its side flat and its edges straight, by means of the very propositions whose factual correctness the examination is supposed to show.”

Of course, one could also understand the concept of rigid geometric spatial configurations as a transcendental concept, formed independently of actual experiences and to which these need not necessarily correspond, as in fact our natural bodies do not correspond in an entirely pure and undistorted manner to the concepts that we have abstracted from them inductively. If we adopted this concept of rigidity understood as an ideal, a strict Kantian surely could then regard geometric axioms as a priori propositions given through transcendental intuition, and these propositions could not be confirmed or refuted by any experience because one should first have to decide in agreement with them whether given natural bodies should be considered rigid. But we should then add that under this interpretation, geometric axioms would certainly not be synthetic statements in Kant’s sense; for they would then only assert an analytic consequence of the concept of rigid geometric configuration necessary for measurement, since one could accept as rigid only those configurations which satisfied the axioms. (Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie, 23-4.)

Here we have a clear statement of the idea that “pure” geometry (analytic a priori) can be separated from “physical” geometry (synthetic a posteriori).

Also Einstein (1921): “[A]s far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”

5 Poincaré and Reichenbach: geometrical conventionalism

Poincaré’s view was that geometry was neither synthetic a priori nor a posteriori, nor analytic a priori. Rather, it was conventional (and therefore without truth-value). Reichenbach later endorsed Poincaré’s conventionalism, but subsumed geometrical conventions under the analytic a priori truths.

5.1 Poincaré

- Distinction: (i) “no fact of the matter”; (ii) under-determination of theory by observation; (iii) conventionalism about truth. Poincaré endorsed (i) and (ii) w.r.t. geometry.
• (ii) in more detail: our geometric observations can be accounted for under any (Rie-
mannian) geometry—including one of varying curvature, provided we are willing also to
postulate compensating universal forces. Example: Poincaré’s disc.

• “Experiment . . . tells us not what is the truest, but what is the most convenient geome-
try” (Poincaré 1902, 70-71).

• “From among all possible groups, that must be chosen which will be, so to speak, the
standard to which we shall refer natural phenomena” (Poincaré 1913, 79).

If we consider physical that deviate sufficiently from the predictions of geometry,
then we consider the change, by an arbitrary convention, as the resultant of two
other component changes. The first component is regarded as a displacement
rigorously satisfying the laws [of the group of displacements] . . . while the second
component, which is small, is regarded as a qualitative alteration. . . . [Thus] these
laws are not imposed by nature upon us, but are imposed by us upon nature. But
if we impose them on nature it is because she suffers us to do so. If she offered
too much resistance, we should seek in our arsenal for another form which would
be more acceptable to her. (Poincaré 1898, 5)

5.2 Reichenbach

• Pure mathematics as implicitly defined structures (Hilbert, Schlick, Carnap).

• Coordinative definitions and the “relative a priori”: constitutive, but not apodictic.
Principles that are “not necessary to believe, but if believed they must be believed
necessary”. (Another instance of the Weltanschauung idea.)

• Do apparently rigid objects change size as they are transported?

The problem does not concern a matter of cognition but of definition. There is no
way of knowing whether a measuring rod retains its length when it is transported
to another place; a statement of this kind can only be introduced by a definition.
For this purpose a coordinative definition is to be used, because two physical
objects distant from each other are defined as equal in length. It is not the concept
equality of length which is to be defined, but a real object corresponding to it is
to be pointed out. A physical structure is coordinated to the concept equality of
length, just as the standard meter is coordinated to the concept unit of length.
(1958, 16)

• Universal vs. differential forces. The dynamical approach to geometry is characterized
by a veto on universal forces. But for Reichenbach, the adoption of the dynamical
approach is a convention.

• The strong equivalence principle in general relativity (recall lecture 3): the identification
of gravitational effects and inertial effects.
6 Putnam and Ben-Menahem: conventionalism “refuted”?

- The inference from (ii) to (i) (top of p. 4, above) requires the assumptions that: (a) we have no direct perception of spatial relations; (b) the (currently conceived) possible facts of observation exhaust the relevant considerations.

- Kantians may deny (a), but they must contend with Helmholtz’s and Reichenbach’s apparent evidence that alternative geometries are intuitable.

- Putnam (1974) argues that (b) is a species of essentialism, albeit a “negative essentialism”. I.e., the conventionalist assumes that “only a few [properties] could be part of a concept” (32). But this overlooks the “open texture” of our concepts.

- Putnam, inspired by Quine’s pragmatic holism, argues that internal coherence, as opposed to external coherence (= agreement with the evidence), may be a deciding factor. In the specific case of geometry in general relativity, Putnam claims that considerations of internal coherence mandate geometric empiricism (and claims further that this was Reichenbach’s view all along). But in general there is “no fact of the matter as to whether or not there is a fact of the matter.” (See also Carnap (1966, Ch. 17).)

- (b) is put under further pressure by the observation that under-determination between rival interpretations may be broken by future theoretical developments. Ben-Menahem (2006): “The distinction between theory and interpretation is unstable over time.” Equivalent interpretations tend to inspire divergent research programmes. So although rival interpretations may be empirically equivalent (under all conceivable evidence), their theoretical successors may not be (inertia vs. the graviton). And don’t forget: the strong equivalence principle has empirical consequences which may yet turn out to be false.

7 Further Reading

- * Ben-Menahem, Y. (2006), Conventionalism: from Poincare to Quine (Cambridge: CUP), Ch. 3.


- Coffa, J. A. (1991), To the Vienna Station: The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, edited by L. Wessels (Cambridge: CUP), Ch. 3.


- Poincaré, H. (1905/1952), Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover), Chs. 3-5.
